EDITORIAL NOTES.
By W. D. L.
THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE CO3IMISSION AGAIN.
THE PARTY RATE QUESTION.

IN the last number of this periodical we had a few
words to say in regard to the Interstate Commerce Commission. What was then said was suggested by a perusal of
the recently published report of that body) and related
chiefly to the legal status of the Commission, and to the
various attitudes which Congress might adopt toward it.
There is another matter in this connection which may
be commented upon with profit. It is the final settlement
by the Supreme Court of the "Party Rate Question."
As far back as July io, 1889, the Pittsburg, Cincinnati
& St. Louis Railroad Company filed its complaint against
the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company.1 The ground of
the complaint was that the defendant company, being a
competitor of the plaintiff, issued what is known as party
rate tickets. A party rate ticket is a single ticket good for
a single fare for a specified number of persons. They were
issued by the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company to any
one who chose to apply, and were sold at a reduced rate
over the rate for a single person for a single fare. That is,
one who traveled in a party could travel more cheaply than
one who was traveling alone. The decision of the Commission, delivered by Mr. Commissioner VEAZEY, was made
on February 21, i89o. It was in favor of the plaintiff.
In other words, party rate tickets were declared illegal
under the Interstate Commerce Act.
The ground for this decision on the part of the Conimission was two-fold. The Act provides, . I, that "All
charges made for any service rendered . . . in the
shall be reasonable
transportation of passengers
,I. Interstate Con. Com. Rep.,

572.
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and just." Section 2 further adds "that if any common
carrier . . . shall . . . collect or receive from any person or persons a greater or less compensation for any service,
etc. . . . than it charges . . . any other person
or persons for doing
.
.
a like and contemporaneous
service in the transportation of a like kind of traffic under
substantially similar circumstances, such common carrier
shall be guilty of an unjust discrimination."
§3
makes it unlawful "to give any particular person any unreasonable preference or advantage."
Section 22, as amended
by § 9 of Act of March 21, 1889,1 says : "That nothing in
this Act shall prevent
.
.
the issuaice of mileage,
excursion or commutation passenger tickets." The Commission read these sections in the light of the assumption
that Congress, in forbidding unjust discrimination, meant
to include in the terms "unjust discrimination" any
difference in the'same service to each individual, and that
as it was necessarily the same service to A, who was taken
from X to Y, as it was to B, a member of a party of ten,
who was taken between the same points, he should be
charged the same price. In accordance with this reasoning,
the Commission consider that all discrimination is against
the terms of the Act, and had it not been for § 22, all
excursion, commutation and mileage tickets would have
been unlawful.
Thus, in showing the discrimination which exists
where party rate tickets are issued, Commissioner VEAzFY
says: "It is difficult to see how this individual equality is
preserved in a carload of say nineteen persons, all starting
from the same destination, if ten of them pay two cents
per mile each and the other nine three cents." This
reasoning would apply with equal force to commutation
or excursion tickets. But the position of the Commission
is still more plainly seen in another part of Commissioner
VEAzEY'S opinion, where we read, in answer to the arguments of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, that
the order of the Commission would drive theatrical mana'Stats. at Large, 855-862.
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gers from the business, that "as the ticket cannot be sustained on the ground of equality of service and rate, and is
not embraced within the accepted classes, this Commission
has no power to furnish relief."
The order of the Commission was disregarded by the
Railroad Company. The Commission then appealed to the
Circuit Court for the Western District of Ohio for an
injunction to restrain the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
Company from issuing party rate tickets.
The Circuit
Court gave its decision on August xi, i89o. They denied
the injundtion on the.ground that party rate tickets were
not forbidden by the Interstate Commerce Act. Both Judges
JACKSON and SAGE delivered opinions.' Judge JACKSON
thought that a party rate ticket was fairly included under
the exception in § 22 of the Act in favor of commutation
tickets. He also thought that, even if this contention
could not be maintained, as the discrimination between
parties of ten and a single person was not an unjust discrimination, it was unobjectionable.
Judge SAGE, on the other hand, though he reached
the same conclusion, that party rate tickets could fairly
be said to be commutation tickets, did not agree with
Judge JACKSON in thinking that any discrimination was
allowable under the Act except an unjust discrimination.
Whether any just discrimination is prevented by the
Act, or rather, whether every discrimination must be proved
unjust before being condemned, depends on the proper construction of § 2, which forbids different charges for "a like
and contemporaneous service."
Judge JACKSON asks :
" When a carrier's charges are reasonable and just, how
can they be regarded or treated as constituting an unjust
discrimination under § 2 ?"
But § 2 does not say anything about an unjust discrimination, and thus we find Judge SAGE acknowledging that
"if those traveling under party rate tickets are charged
less than other individuals for like and contemporaneous
services, under substantially the same circumstances and
'43 Fed. Rep., 37.
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conditions, itisconclusive, and the issuance of the tickets
must be adjudged unlawful. This, which was also the
position of the Commission, appeals to us as the only possible interpretation of § 2 of the Act. The real difference
between Judge SAGE and the Commission lay in the different interpretation which each put on the intent of § 22.
The Commission, as we have said, read § 22 of the Act as
making exceptions to certain classes of cases which § 2 had
declared unlawful. As opposed to this view, judge SAGE
says: "The true construction of the section appears to be
that it specified certain discriminations, not rejarded by
Congress as within the letter'or spirit of the Act, and, therefore, it provides that the Act shall not be construed to prevent them; and the instances given, are illustrative rather
than exhaustive. It is a section furnishing an"express rule
of construction."
In other words, that the section furnishes an index of how § 2 shall be construed, and 'as
"these tickets are in principle in no wise different from
mileage, excursion and commutation tickets," this would
render them lawful as far as the Act is concerned.
The word same is, perhaps, as treacherous an instrument to convey definite ideas as any in our language.
Where we shall draw the line as to what is the " same service " is largely a matter of choice. The distance from A
to B is the same as from C to D. Is it the same service to
take one from A to B as from C to D? The conditions
whose contemporaneous existence is necessary to fulfil the
conditions of the "same service" are, unless Congress has
given a rule of interpretation, entirely a matter of individual
choice. Congress, in § 22, when it provided that nothing
in the Act should preve.nt the issuance of commutation,
mileage tickets, etc., gave a rule of constrtiction. It either,
as the Commerce Commission contended, prohibited every
other form of ticket except the ones excepted from the
operation of the section, and in so doing showed that § 2
considered a commutation and a.single ticket as providing
the same service for different rates; or, as advocated by
Judge SAGE, § 22 showed that commutation tickets were
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not the same service as single tickets, within the meaning
of § 2.
Whether A, who takes a single ride, has the same
service performed for him, within the meaning of the
Interstate Commerce Law, as one who is taken once out of
thirty times, or whether to carry a single man is the same
service as to carry one man out of ten, largely detpends, in
our estimation, on what the Act was meant to prevent.
This we find from § I and § 3. First, the Act was intended
to prevent any charges from being unjustly high; Second,
it was made to prevent discrimination between individuals; Thirdly, it meant to restrain unjust favoritism
to any particular class of people under any particular conditions. The particular rates given on party rate tickets
may offend against the third purpose of the Act, but not
against the other two, if these tickets are open to all people
traveling in parties. There is a difference between contracting to take a party and contracting separately to take
several individuals. It is the difference between wholesale
and retail. Whenever there is a difference in service this
fact justifies a difference in fare, but the difference should
not be so great at to discriminate unjustly against the class
desiring one service and not the other.
This was substantially the argument adopted by lMfr.
Justice BROWN when he delivered the opinion of the
Supreme Court affirming the decision of the Circuit Court.'
In conclusion, there is one other point which we wish
to speak of. We have said that one of the purposes of the
Act was to prevent unjust discriminations between different
classes of people. On this we question a criterion of a
just discrimination laid down by Mr. Justice JACKSON. It
had been proved that both the rate for a party of ten and
for a single passenger, charged by the Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad Company, were reasonable, yet it was contended
that the difference was an unjust discrimination against the
single passenger. Mr. Justice JACKSON asks: "How can
this position (in view of this fact) be sustained?" And
Decided May 16, 1892, reported 5 Int. Coin. Com. Rep., 92.

